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1. Introduction
With the deregulation of telecommunication industry and the fast development of broadband
wireless technologies, i.e., Wireless Mesh Network (WMN), WiFi (802.11g) and WiMAX
(802.16), it can be imagined that in the future users can access Internet or other wireless
services, e.g., telephony, through diverse wireless service providers (WSPs) and technologies.
In this complex networking landscape, moving decision-making from access points to users
is a path to achieving system scalability (Zemlianov & de Veciana, 2005). Thus, for users,
it is increasingly the case that they have more freedom to choose among several WSPs who
provide wireless services instead of being contractually tied to a single WSP. For example,
a user wishing to access the Internet via a WiFi hotspot or access point (AP) may find him
in a zone covered by several wireless access providers, or he may choose among different
transmission platforms: WiFi, WiMAX, 3G, and so on. In such a market, in which multiple
WSPs compete for users who are price- and congestion-sensitive, it is important to investigate
the economic issues that arise due to the presence of multiple competing service providers.
In such a competitive environment, all players are self-interested in a sense that their actions
or reactions in response to others’ actions only focus on maximizing their own payoffs. From
a WSP’s point of view, it has to compete for users with other WSPs while maximizing its
profit. From a user’s point of view, he aims to maximize his compensated utility by choosing
a WSP offering the best trade-off between quality of service (QoS) and price. Our primary
goal is to understand how each WSP sets its price in the presence of price-sensitive and
congestion-sensitive users and other competing WSPs to maximize its own profit. Note that
we focus on the price setting problem among multiple WSPs instead of price discrimination
among users. Thus we simply assume that the users are homogeneous in utility functions and
willingness to pay.
According to the current design of WMN architectures, a user’s requests will be routed to one
AP or base station (BS) (in the IEEE802.16 standards APs of the IEEE 802.11 are called base
stations) automatically so that the data flows generated by the user’s requests can take the
most appropriate route in terms minimum hop count or other QoS metrics (i.e., bandwidth,
end-to-end delay, and so on). However, from the user’s point of view, besides QoS, the price
is also an important consideration when the user selects an AP or BS for wireless service
delivery. It is generally accepted that the current wireless data network models are flawed in
the sense that they fail to capture (Das et al., 2004):
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– The utility of the services and network from the user’s perspective;
– The impact of user demands on revenue utility from the service providers perspective.
Even though the current design of architectures, algorithms and protocols for WMNs does
take users’ QoS requirement into account, price competition among WSPs is not taken into
consideration. We believe that in the presence of competition among multiple WSPs with
different prices resource distributions within the network would be affected significantly. This
would in turn affect the engineering design of WMNs and other wireless delivery models. In
our pricing model, we assume that users can choose a WSP’s AP or BS based on the WSPs’
quoted prices and the perceived QoS instead of just being directed automatically to a certain
AP or BS by routing protocols.
In order to obtain a return on investment, each service provider needs a pricing strategy to
charge its users for the service it offers. Pricing communication network services has been
seen as a soft tool to cope with congestion, to control demand, and to induce users to use
the network in a desirable way while maximizing service providers’ profits. A well-designed
dynamic pricing policy allows a service provider to capture the changes of users behavior
and network status, and to adjust its prices based on these dynamic changes. In the case
of high network utilization, the service provider increases its price, which in turn makes
price-sensitive users reduce their demand as a response. Similarly, in the case of low network
utilization, the service provider decreases its price to attract more users. With a proper pricing
scheme, a service provider and its users are allowed to act individually to express the values
that they are willing to charge or pay, and to reach an equilibrium where their individual
utilities are maximized simultaneously. Furthermore, in the presence of other competing
service providers, each WSP’s price is dependent on other service providers’ prices and
network status, which affect users behavior because utility maximizing users always choose
the service provider offering the best combination of price and QoS.
Game theory attempts to model the strategic interactions among self-interested players
who must make choices that potentially affect other players’ interests. In particular,
non-cooperative game theory is primarily used as a typical modeling tool to analyze situations
in which players’ payoffs depend on the actions of other players. In principle, in a
non-cooperative game each player makes his decision independently and attempts to get the
most out of the game on the basis that the other player is not cooperating in any way. In this
chapter, we discuss an oligopoly, in which multiple WSPs with asymmetric costs providing
wireless services with possibly different qualities compete for a group of users through their
prices, using a game-theoretical approach. Our objective is to develop a framework to analyze
the interaction among multiple competing WSPs and price- and congestion-sensitive users
and identify the Nash equilibrium prices.
2. Game theory for oligopoly and its applications to communication network
pricing
Game theory aims at modeling situations in which players have to make specific moves1 that
have mutual, possibly conflicting, consequences. In particular, it studies interactions among
self-interested players in a way that interaction strategies can be designed to maximize the
payoff of a player in a multi-player game. It also enable the development of mechanisms that
have certain desirable properties. As its name suggests, the basic concepts of game theory
1In the game theory terminology, a move constitutes taking a decision that will have pre-determined
consequences.
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arose from the study of games such as chess and checkers (Parsons et al., 2002). However,
it rapidly became clear that the techniques and results of game theory can be applied to all
interactions that occur between self-interested players. The classic game theoretic question
asked is: what is the best or the most rational thing a player can do? In most multi-player
games, the overall outcome depends critically on the choices made by all players involved.
This implies that in order for a player to make a choice that optimizes his payoff, he must
reason strategically. That is, the player must take into account the decisions that other
players may make, and must assume that they will act rationally so as to optimize their own
payoffs. Game theory provides a mathematical framework for formalizing and analyzing
these situations and finding the possible results of the games.
Emerging as a tool for modeling and solving economic problems, game theory has also
found its way into other domains where conflicting multiple parties have conflicting goals.
Naturally, it has been used extensively for studying pricing problems for the Internet, or
more generally telecommunication networks, e.g. (Altman & Basar, 1998) (La & Anantharam,
1999) (Altman et al., 2006) (Musacchio & Walrand, 2006). In Internet pricing, the fundamental
aspects of multi-party (Internet service providers (ISPs) and users) optimization problems can
be captured by game theory. The outcomes of a game are the utilities of every players. The
ISPs and the users respectively choose their best strategies (the price for the ISPs and the
demand for the users for instance) to get their desired outcomes.
Normally, pricing with a game theoretic approach is related to network resource management
problem. Cooperative game theory, which requires signalization or agreements among player,
has been used to obtain a Nash bargaining framework to address network issues like resource
allocation, network efficiency, fairness and at the same time service provider’s revenue
maximization and pricing (Yaı¨che et al., 2000). In (Dziong & Mason, 1996), it is shown that
the cooperation between two ISPs benefits both the ISPs and the users. In (La & Anantharam,
2002), La et al. propose an algorithm in which the network providers adjust their prices
and the users adjust their rates so that an optimal equilibrium is reached, while maintaining
proportional fairness.
However, in a wireless service competition market with multiple competing WSPs and a
set of users, all players have conflicting interests. On one hand, the WSPs’ ultimate goal
is to maximize their own revenues. Their attempt to maximize user’s satisfaction, system
utilization, etc., is merely an approach to achieve this ultimate goal. Hence, in this WSPs
and users game, the revenue is modeled as the WSP’s payoff. On the other hand, users want
to maximize their own satisfaction with minimum expense, given that they have freedom to
choose their WSPs and switch from one WSP to another. Then the user’s overall satisfaction is
modeled as user payoff. Since these two goals are different and even conflict with each other,
there is no apparent motivation for WSPs and users to cooperate with each other to achieve a
single optimal goal as suggested by cooperative game theory2.
In contrast to cooperative game theory, non-cooperative game theory is concerned with
situations in which players’ payoffs (utilities) depend on the actions of other players and in
which the players cannot, in principle, sign binding agreements enforceable by third parties.
The following sections give a brief introduction to the theory of non-cooperative games and
its applications in Internet price competition games.
2Given that cooperation by the WSPs is incompatible with most regulatory frameworks, the interaction
among the WSPs can also not be modeled by cooperative game theory.
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2.1 Non-cooperative games in strategic form and nash equilibrium
Non-cooperative game theory is a powerful tool for solving problems with conflicting goals.
In a non-cooperative game, there are a number of players who have potentially conflicting
interests, where each player has a set of strategies with associated payoff values, and makes
his decision independently and attempts to obtain the best payoff without cooperating any
player in any way. The outcome of the game is a set of strategies, each coming from the
strategy set of an individual player, that optimizes the payoffs of all players. In the context of
wireless data networks, the player are the WSPs and users. In compliance with the practice of
game theory, we assume that both WSPs and users, are rational, meaning that their objectives
are to maximize their payoffs (or utilities) individually.
Basically, there are two types of representations generally used to represent a game. Strategic
form (or normal form) is the basic type used in studying non-cooperative games. Normally,
strategic form games deal with the situation where the strategy decision of each player is made
at the same time without observing the decision of the other player. On the other hand, the
extensive form (also called a game tree) is a description of how a game is played over time. It is
generally assumed that a single player can move based on observation of the prior choices of
other players when the game is at a given stage. Generally speaking, games in extensive form
deal with the situation where at least one player has partial information about other players’
decision. There are two different scenarios for an extensive form game: a game of complete
information is the strategic interaction when players are aware of each other’s strategies or
payoffs, i.e., all factors are common knowledge. In the game of incomplete information, at
least one player is unaware of the payoffs or strategies of the other player.
In today’s competitive communication market, it is impossible for service providers to
divulge their payoffs or strategies to their rivals. In this chapter, all WSPs simultaneously
and independently compute their quoted prices without the knowledge of their opponents’
payoffs or strategies. Each WSP sets its own prices based on the users’ response, but has no
knowledge about other WSPs’ prices and the users’ response to other WSPs’ prices in real
time. Clearly, in this pricing game among multiple competing WSPs, the users’ reaction to
the WSPs’ quoting prices and QoS is the determining factor. Therefore, this price competition
game can be divided into two games:
– a game between the WSPs and users which can be expressed as a leader-follower game in
strategic form with the users as the follower responding to the WSPs’ prices and QoS; and
– a game among the WSPs which can be expressed as a simultaneous move game in strategic
form.
A game in strategic form can be defined as G = (i ∈ N,Si,Ui), where N is the set of players,
each of whom attempts to maximize his own particular utility. Si represents the strategy
space of player i, which is the set of all possible strategies of player i. A joint set of the strategy
spaces of all players constitutes a strategy profile s = {s1, s2, . . . , sN}. ui(s) is payoff or utility
that quantifies the outcome of game for player i given the strategy profile s. Fig. 1 illustrates a
simplest example of two-player strategic form game with each player having two strategies.
In our case the players are a set of WSPs whose strategy and payoff are price and profit,
respectively, and a group of homogeneous users who need to decide to choose which WSP to
submit their requests based on the combination of the WSPs’ offered prices and corresponding
QoS, which are factors of user’s utility function. Note that we have assumed that the users are
homogeneous in utility function in the introduction to this chapter. We further assume that
the profit function are the same for all WSPs.
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Player1
Player2
s22
s12
Strategy
Strategy
u1({s11, s21}), u2({s11, s21})s11
s21
u1({s12, s21}), u2({s12, s21}) u1({s12, s22}), u2({s12, s22})
u1({s11, s22}), u2({s11, s22})
Fig. 1. A two-player game in strategic form.
To solve the game, the concept of best response needs to be introduced first. The best response
of player i to the profile of strategies of other players is a strategies s
′
i such that
ui(s
′
i, s−i) > ui(si, s−i) ∀s−i ∈ S−i, (1)
where subscript −i represents all the players except player i himself. If all players’
strategies are mutual best responses to each other, then no player would have a reason to
deviate from the given strategy profile. The situation in which no players has incentive to
unilaterally changing his current strategy is called a Nash equilibrium. Mathematically, a
Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile s∗ = {s∗1 , s∗2 . . . , s∗N} such that for each player i
ui(s
∗
i , s−i∗ ) ≥ ui(si, s∗−i) ∀si ∈ Si. (2)
In a Nash equilibrium, none of the players can gain by unilateral deviation, which implies that
no single player can leave this point without the cooperation of others in order to improve his
own utility. In other words, a Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile comprised of mutual best
responses of all the players3.
2.2 Price and QoS competition in telecommunication networks
Pricing has been seen as a soft tool to control demand, to cope with congestion and to deal
with heterogeneous applications with different QoS requirements. Therefore, there has been
an increased research interest in telecommunication network pricing, which leads to many
proposals for new pricing schemes motivated by different objectives, e.g. to allocate scarce
network resources efficiently in order to maximize social welfare, i.e. (Kelly et al., 1998)
(Low & Lapsley, 1999) (Yaı¨che et al., 2000) (Tassiulas et al., 2001) (La & Anantharam, 2002)
(Shu & Varaiya, 2003) (Qiu & Marbach, 2003), to maximize service provider’s revenue, i.e.
(Basar & Srikant, 2002) (M. Bouhtou & Wynter, 2003), to guarantee fairness among users,
i.e. (Kelly et al., 1998) (Kelly, 2000), to satisfy QoS requirements for differentiated network
services (La & Anantharam, 1999) (Wang & Schulzrinne, 1999) (Mandjes, 2003). With the
rapid growth of wireless data networks, e.g. wireless ad hoc networks and wireless mesh
networks, recently many price-based resource allocation schemes also have been propose for
wireless data networks, i.e. (Xue et al., 2003) (Das et al., 2004) (Xue et al., 2006) (Lu¨thi et al.,
2006) (Kao & Huan, 2008). Pricing has also been used as an incentive mechanism to stimulate
participation and collaboration of self-interested wireless node in wireless mesh networks, i.e.
(Lam et al., 2006) (Lam et al., 2007).
A very large proportion of these proposed pricing schemes focus on the monopolistic case,
where there is only one service provider dealing with a multitude of users and the the
3It should be noted that even though the Nash equilibrium indicates an equilibrium solution it may
not be a solution that maximize the social welfare.
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service provider is big enough to affect the entire market. However, as telecommunication
networks have progressively switched from a monopolistic network to a oligopolistic one
with competitive service providers, more attention has been given to price competition among
service providers, see for example, (Gibbens et al., 2000) (Cao et al., 2002) (Sakurai et al., 2003)
(Armony & Haviv, 2003) (Ros & Tuffin, 2004) (Khan, 2005) (Zhang et al., 2008).
In practice, markets are often partly regulated and partly competitive. In the rest of this
chapter, we only discuss pricing game under perfect competition in a market without
regulation, in which all service providers have certain market force and there is no provider
so dominant that one of them can control the price. Therefore, no one is the leader and no
one is the follower in such a price competition game. As a consequence, all service providers’
prices are determined by the market in which users have the ability to switch from one service
provider to another. The basic assumptions of the price competition game are that both service
providers play the role of rational decision makers and each service provider knows that the
opponents are also rational. A rational service provider always attempts to select the best
response strategy.
In the rest of this section we will introduce some proposed pricing schemes reported in
literature, which are related the pricing model presented in the next sections.
In (Gibbens et al., 2000), Gibbens et al. develop a framework to analyze competition between
two ISPs, either or both of which may choose to offer multiple service classes. In their
analytic framework, there are two ISPs: ISP1 and ISP2 charging prices p1 and p2 per unit
time respectively. On joining ISPi, a user receives utility Ui(θ) per unit time. Utility Ui(θ)
has three components: a positive benefit V which is independent of which ISP he/she joins; a
dis-benefit which is a function of the degree of congestion on the network of the ISPi Ki and
the user’s preference for congestion θ; and a dis-benefit from having to pay a price pi per unit
time to ISPi for its service. To describe the range of preferences in the population of users in
the simplest manner, assume that there is a continuum of users whose θ parameters form a
population distribution which is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Thus the utility
of a user with preference θ from joining ISPi is defined as
Ui(θ) = V − θKi − pi (3)
For analytical simplicity, congestion on a network is defined as the number of users, Qi,
divided by the capacity of the network, Ci: Ki =
Qi
Ci
. Based on these assumptions, Gibbens
et al. analyze the duopoly price competition for packet-based networks and show that the
unique equilibrium outcome for both networks is to offer a single service class and charge the
same price.
Sakurai et al. (Sakurai et al., 2003) propose an extended model based on Gibbens et al.’s game
theoretic model for the case in which an opt-out strategy is introduced for users. In their
model, the users have three strategy options: joining one of the ISPs and opting out of both
of them. In (Sakurai et al., 2003) it is assumed that ISP1’s price is higher than ISP2’s price,
p1 > p2, and both ISPs have the same fixed capacities C1 = C2 = C. A strategy for a user is a
choice of ISP to join or opting out of both ISPs, given the prices quoted by the ISPs. If the user is
indifferent between the two ISPs, his choice can be made randomly. Sakurai et al. suggest only
the users who don’t like congestion nor higher price opt out of ISP1, or mathematically only
the users whose utility U1(θ)< 0 (0≤ θ ≤ 1) choose opting-out. Therefore, there are two types
of marginal users as shown in Fig. 2: one is the users with congestion preference θ21, who
are indifferent between joining ISP2’s lower priced network and joining ISP1’s higher priced
network; and the other one is the users with congestion preference θ10, who are indifferent
286 Wireless Mesh Networks
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0 θ21 θ10 1
ISP2 ISP1 opt-out
θ
Fig. 2. Critical values of θ21 and θ10 for user preference (Sakurai et al., 2003)
between joining ISP1’s higher priced network and opting out of ISP1. If there are N users
in the market, the numbers of users who join ISP1 and ISP2 are given by Q1 = N(θ10 − θ21)
and Q2 = Nθ21 respectively, provided that 0 < θ21 < θ10. Sakurai et al. conclude that Nash
equilibrium for this non-cooperative game model greatly depends on three factors: the user’s
benefit from using the Internet, V, ISP’s network capacity, C, and the number of users in
market, N.
Notice that the fundamental of both models presented by Gibbens et al. and Sakurai et al. is
to find the critical values of θ∗ determined by the indifference relation U1(θ∗) = U2(θ∗). The
philosophy behind this is that when the user’s utilities for joining either ISP are equal two
ISPs can reach a Nash equilibrium, in which each ISP’s pricing strategy is optimal in the sense
that one ISP has no incentive to change its price strategy in response to the other ISP’s strategy
and vice versa. Because the users are indifferent between joining ISP1 or joining ISP2 when
the utilities for joining either ISP are the same, no user of one ISP has an incentive to switch
to the other ISP and all the users will stay where they are. This means that both ISP have no
incentive to deviate from their current strategies. Indeed, if the users’s compensated utility
with ISP1 is lower than the one with ISP2 and both are positive, the users would switch to
ISP2 until the compensated utility with ISP2 reaches the one with ISP1.
In fact, this philosophy is related to pricing in the presence of delay cost, which has received
increasing interest in study of price competition among providers in communication network
research literature. In (Ros & Tuffin, 2004), Ros et al. propose a mathematical model involving
delay cost for a Paris Metro Pricing (PMP) network, where there are I classes and for the
class i per packet price is pi. In their analytical framework, a total cost function pi + γdi is
associated to a class i, where di is the mean delay for a packet in the network and γ is a
constant converting delay into money. A packet associated with a utility measure U, which is
assumed to follow the same distribution for every packet, enters network i if
i = min
j∈I
pj + γdj and U ≥ pi + γdi. (4)
That means that the packet chooses the least expensive subnetwork in terms of total cost. If
U <minj∈I pj +γdj, the packet does not enter at all, meaning that the network is too expensive
for it. In equilibrium, the distribution of packets among classes has to be stable, meaning that
the total cost pj + γdj is the same for all classes j. If for a given class j the value pj + γdj were
smaller than the total cost of the other classes, then new packets entering the network would
choose class j until its total cost reaches that of other classes. This corresponds to a Wardrop
equilibrium (Altman & Wynter, 2002) which can be described as: demand is distributed in
such a way that all users choose one of the cheapest providers. Even though the aim of
Ros et al.’s model is to analyze the so-called PMP scheme which separates the network into
different and independent subnetworks, the analytical framework can be extended to analyze
multi-providers competition, because each subnetwork in their model behaves equivalently
and the customers (data packets) choose their subnetwork taking into account the prices and
the QoS offered by different subnetwork, which are in common with the multi-providers
competition.
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Duopoly competition in the presence of a delay cost has also been studied by Armony et
al. (Armony & Haviv, 2003). They analyze the price competition between two firms offering
identical services under the assumption that all customers, belonging to one of two classes and
differing by their waiting cost parameters, value the received service identically. Note that
each type of customers, H-customers and L-customers, has its own waiting cost parameter,
defined as the cost a customer incurs per unit of waiting time. Besides the choice between
the two firms, the customers also have an option of balking, which is not included in Ros
et al.’s work (Ros & Tuffin, 2004). The expected utility of a customer with a cost parameter
C (C = L, H) who joins firm i is R − pi − CWi, where R is customers’ value for receiving
service, pi is the price charged by firm i and Wi is the expected waiting time (reponse time)
determined using a M/M/1 queue. The corresponding utility associated with balking is
assumed to be zero4. In their analysis, customers use mixed equilibrium strategies that specify
the probability with which the customers choose each one of the firms given any pair of prices
while firms use pure strategies in choosing what prices to charge per customer.
In (Zhang et al., 2008), a pricing competition model for packet-switching networks with a QoS
guarantee in terms of an expected per-packet delay is studied. Zhang et al. propose a general
framework in which service providers offering multi-class priority-based services compete
to maximize their profits, while satisfying the expected delay guarantee in each class. The
customer is assumed to have to choose a class of service from a service provider based on
their preference for the guaranteed delay announced by the service providers. Zhang et al.’s
work is also related to pricing in the presence of delay cost, which is assumed to be a linear
function of the delay sensitivity h, γh, where γ is a constant and h is uniformly distributed
between [0,1]. Then the expected net benefit to a user with (v, h) for sending a message in class
i from provider j is v− pi,j −γhdi, where, v is user’s value assigned to the transmission of each
packet in a message, and di is the expected per-packet delay guarantee, which is determined
using Mx/G/1/Pr queuing theory results. The benefit to the user for not choosing any service
is zero. Two cases are studied in (Zhang et al., 2008): the case of fixed delay guarantee and the
case that providers compete in both delay guarantee and price. For both cases, it is found that
equilibrium outcome is symmetric (p1 = p2).
3. A duopoly pricing model for wireless data networks under congestion-sensitive
users
In this section, we present the basic model, which has been presented in (Zhu et al., 2009), for
the pricing game under two WSPs competition based on the works of (Gibbens et al., 2000)
and (Sakurai et al., 2003), which addresses the question of duopoly with demand-dependent
quality. In this pricing game, the players are:
1. two WSPs: WSP1 and WSP2, who compete to maximize their individual profits in a market;
2. a group of homogeneous users who are price-as well as congestion-sensitive.
For analytical convenience, we assume that both WSPs’ capacities are fixed and equal so that
the only strategy for the WSPs is related to setting its price. We focus on the pricing strategies
of the WSPs and analyze a Nash equilibrium for this two WSPs competition with regard to
their pricing strategies. Given the prices and QoS offered by the WSPs, a strategy for a user is
a choice of which WSP to join or opting out of both WSPs.
4This excludes the very real situation where the utility of balking is actually negative.
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User
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Fig. 3. Pricing model for two WSPs
3.1 Basic model
We model this oligopoly as a two-stage non-cooperative game: first, in stage 1, both WSPs
set their prices to maximize their profits respectively. Then, in stage 2, given prices quoted
by both WSPs and their QoS, the users decide whether purchase the service, and if so, from
which WSP. Note that the two stages are solved sequentially. Given prices quoted by the WSPs
and perceived QoS, the users decide in Stage 2 to choose which WSP. Based on the decisions
of the users, in Stage 1 the WSPs adjust their optimal prices. This sequential decision-making
process is illustrated in Fig. 3.
Suppose there are two WSPs: WSP1 and WSP2 in a market competing to maximize their
individual profits. Assume WSP1 and WSP2 set prices p1 and p2 respectively per packet
transmission, and the costs for providing per packet transmission are c1 and c2 respectively.
Let the profit of WSP1 and WSP2 be denoted as Π1 and Π2 respectively. Obviously, Πi is a
function of the price charged per packet, pi, and the WSPi’s cost, ci.
In this duopoly, both WSPs are able to change their prices based on their congestion status
while the price- and congestion-sensitive users who are connecting to one WSP are able to
switch to WSP anytime they want. In other words, the users’ association with the WSPs would
be on a per-service or per-session basis. However, each WSP only knows its own quoting
prices, it own cost and the users response to its quoting price, and has no knowledge about
its rival’s price, cost and the users response to its rival’s price in real time. It is a realistic
assumption because it is not allowed for a WSP to divulge its private information to its rivals.
Therefore, the users’ reaction to the multiple WSPs’ prices and QoS is the determining factor
in this two WSPs’ price competition game.
Assume the behavior of all users are identical and economically rational, so we can view all
the requests as being from the same user and simply use the singular word “user”. On joining
WSPi (i = 1,2), a user receives gross utility Ui. Consider each WSP as a system that can only
serve a finite population of potential users, meaning that the gross utility that the user obtains
when subscribing to one WSP depends partly on the level of congestion or QoS of the WSP.
Obviously, generally speaking, the larger the number of users subscribe to a WSP, the lower
the gross utility the users can obtain because the level of congestion increases as users join.
However, QoS may take many different forms, such as response time, bit-error rate, packet
delay, and so forth. For the purpose of facilitating analysis, mean packet delay (or response
time), ED, is used to determine the utility experienced by a user in this chapter. Clearly, the
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mean packet delay is affected by the number of users who subscribe to the same WSP.
A strategy for the user has three options: subscribing to WSP1; subscribing to WSP2; opting
out of both of them. To define the strategy of the user mathematically, we have to introduce
the concept of compensated utility, which is gross utility minus price. As defined in (Mandjes,
2003) without loss of generality, the compensated utility curves can be defined as:
U(ED) = U(ED)− p with U(ED) = ED−θ , (5)
where U(·) is gross utility and θ > 0. To simplify the calculation, we choose θ = 1. Thus, the
user’s gross utility U(ED) = 1/ED and the compensated utility U(ED) = 1/ED − p. Note
that U(ED) monotonically decreases with its argument ED.
The user wants to use the service as long as his compensated utility is positive. If the
compensated utilities that the user receives from both WSPs are negative, the user will choose
to submit neither of them. Then, if the compensated utilities that a user receives from one
WSP or both of them are positive, the user will choose the WSP from which he receives the
higher compensated utility. In other words, the user’s strategy strongly depends on the price
difference and the QoS performance difference between these two WSPs.
Suppose that mean packet delays for WSP1 and WSP2 are ED1 and ED2 respectively. Denote
U1(ED1) and U2(ED2) as the user’s gross utility for WSP1 and WSP2 respectively. Thus,
– if U1(ED1)− p1 < 0 and U2(ED2)− p2 < 0, the user will opt out of both WSPs;
– if U1(ED1)− p1 > U2(ED2)− p2 > 0, the user will subscribe to WSP1;
– if U2(ED2)− p2 > U1(ED1)− p1 > 0, the user will subscribe to WSP2;
– only if U1(ED1)− p1 = U2(ED2)− p2 > 0, the user is indifferent between WSP1 and WSP2.
In the situation in which the indifference relation
U1(ED1)− p∗1 = U2(ED2)− p∗2 (6)
holds, a newly arriving user randomly selects WSPi with probability 50%, and there is no
incentive for a user who has already joined one WSP to unilaterally change his current
strategy because user derives no benefit from switching to another WSP. Therefore, the pair
of prices (p∗1 , p
∗
2), which also maximize Π1 and Π2 simultaneously, is a Nash equilibrium. In
equilibrium, the distribution of users between the two APs is stable beacuse the compensated
utility Ui(EDi) with both WSPs are the same. Indeed, if for a newly arriving user the
compensated utility with the WSP1, U1(ED1), is greater than the compensated utility with
the WSP2, U2(ED2), the newly arriving user would choose WSP1 and the existing users
with WSP2 would switch to WSP1 until the compensated utility with WSP1 reaches that with
WSP2. Addtionally, in equilibrium, both WSPs also have no unilateral incentive to change
their current optimal prices, because changing price could lead to an increase or decrease in
the user’ compensated utility and create an incentive for the user to change his strategy.
3.2 Duopoly queuing model
We first assume that there are N independent users in this duopoly. All the users generate
information packets that they feed into the system after they submit to a WSP. The users who
submit to the same WSP share a First-In-First-Serve (FIFS) based queuing and scheduling
system. To simplify the analysis, we assume the information packets arrival process and the
service time distributions, respectively, are Poisson and Exponential, which is called M/M/1
model (Hock, 1996). In this M/M/1/FCFS system, packets generated by the N users arrive
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according to a Poisson process with mean rate λN (this rate includes those who select to
opt out of both WSPs) and the service times of individual packet for both WSPs are i.i.d.
exponentially distributed with mean µ−1 given the assumption that both APs have the same
bandwidth. Thus, the mean packet delay for WSPi is:
ED =
1
µ− λNEi(pi)
, (7)
where E(pi) is the expectation of the acceptance for the price pi. Note that Equation 7
only holds provided that µ > λNE(pi). We will show later that even though these system
parameters are important for our analysis the equilibrium prices in our pricing model are
independent of any system parameter. Since the user’s compensated utility is a function of
the response time, ED, the only information that a user needs to know is the response times
of the packets generated by him when making his choice. We believe that it is practically
possible for a WSP to inform each user of the response time of the packets generated by him.
In (Jagannatha et al., 2002) Jagannathan et al. suggest a parameterized customer behavior
model for customer’s willingness-to-pay to a given price using a Pareto distribution of
customer capacity to pay. Every customer has the capacity to pay based on a Pareto
distribution with scale b and shape α, where all customers have capacities at least as large
as b and α determines how the capacities are distributed. The greater the value of α, the fewer
the users who can pay more than b. When α→∞, all users have the same capacity b. However,
for a normal service, the shape α would be expected to be a very large but finite number. It is
reasonable to assume that users’ willingness-to-pay is associated with their capacities to pay.
Therefore, the expectation of acceptance for a given price pi is:
Ei(pi) =
{
1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi 0≤ pi ≤ bi;
δi
αi+δi
( bipi )
αi pi > bi,
(8)
where shape αi, scale bi and user-willingness elasticity δi are determined by WSPi based on its
own observation. Different WSPs should have different values of these parameters. Since a
WSP provider can observe the users’ acceptance to the quoted price online, these parameters
can be learned using an adaptive algorithm suggested by Jagannathan et al. in (Jagannatha
et al., 2002) from the observed acceptance rate for a given price. In fact, the process of learning
these parameters is a dynamic process with an aim to adjust the quoted price in line with
the change of the user’s compensated utility. The objective of dynamically learning these
parameters is to capture the time-varying feature of customer behavior.
Then the expression for the user’s compensated utility Ui with WSPi can be written as:
Ui = Ui(EDi)− pi = 1/EDi − pi = µ− λNEi(pi)− pi. (9)
According to the analysis of Nash equilibrium in previous section, a pair of prices (p∗1 , p
∗
2) is
in Nash equilibrium if and only if the following condition is satisfied:
E2(p
∗
2)− E1(p∗1) =
p∗1 − p∗2
λN
,
subject to µ− λNE1(p∗1)− p∗1 > 0 or µ− λNE2(p∗2)− p∗2 > 0.
(10)
In the next section we will study the problem of identifying the Nash equilibrium prices
(p∗1 , p
∗
2) between the two WSPs.
291Wirel ss Service P icing under Multipl  Competitive Providers and Congestion-sensitive Users
www.intechopen.com
12 Wireless Mesh Networks
3.3 The price selection problem
The profit of WSPi is defined as the expected number of packets transmitted by the users who
subscribe to WSPi per unit time, multiplied by the difference between the price per packet, pi,
and the cost per packet, ci. Thus the profit function for APi per unit time, Πi, for a given price
pi is given by:
Πi = λNEi(pi)(pi − ci) (11)
Since an AP provider’s prime concern is cost recovery, it is reasonable to assume that an WSP
will set its price greater than or at least equal to its cost ci,
The objective of each WSP is to select a price that will maximize its profit. Therefore, a strategic
equilibrium (p∗1 , p
∗
2) for the two WSPs has to satisfies the following relations first:
∀p1 : Π1(p∗1) ≥ Π1(p1)
∀p2 : Π1(p∗2) ≥ Π2(p2)
(12)
Mathematically, the profit of APi is maximized for the first order condition ∂Πi∂pi = 0. There are
two cases need to be discussed:
– CASE 1: When pi > bi, Ei(pi) =
δi
αi+δi
( bipi )
αi , with which
Πi(pi) = λN
δi
αi + δi
(
bi
pi
)αi (pi − ci); (13)
– CASE 2: When 0≤ pi ≤ bi, Ei(pi) = 1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi , with which
Πi(pi) = λN[1− αiαi + δi
(
pi
bi
)δi ](pi − ci). (14)
It can be proved that there is at least one maximization point in the range of ci ≤ pi ≤ bi and
pi > bi respectively. Thus, solving the following maximization problem gives the optimal price
at which the WSPi maximizes its profit:
maxΠi(pi) =
{
λN[1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi ](pi − ci) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi;
λN δiαi+δi (
bi
pi
)αi (pi − ci) pi > bi.
(15)
Since a user has three options: subscribing to WSP1, subscribing to WSP2 or opting out of both
of them, ∑2i=1 Ei(pi) must be smaller than or equal to 1. Note that here Ei(pi) is the acceptance
rate at which WSPi’s expected profit is maximized. In other words, only if WSPi ensures the
acceptance rate Ei(pi), can the best payoff be achieved by choosing the optimal price piopt .
Combining the constraint condition ∑2i=1 Ei(pi) ≤ 1 with Equation 10 and Equation 15, the
optimal price piopt that maximizes WSPi’s excepted profits must satisfy:
max
i∈{1,2}
Πi(pi) =
{
λN[1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi ](pi − ci) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi
λN δiαi+δi (
bi
pi
)αi (pi − ci) pi > bi,
subject to U1 = U2 > 0 and E1(p1) + E2(p2) ≤ 1.
(16)
However, Equation 16 is difficult to solve mathematically. To investigate the Nash equilibrium
for this model, we provide numerical examples in the following section.
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3.4 Numerical Examples
Since there is at least one maximization point for Πi defined in Equation 16 within the ranges
of ci ≤ pi ≤ bi and pi > bi respectively, we have to study the expression for Πi further to
determine which one is the maximization point for all pi > ci. Indeed, there is only one
maximum for the profit function defined in Equation 15 within the ranges of pi ≥ ci as shown
in Fig. 4(a). Fig. 4(b) further plots the expected profit per unit time for different assumed
values of willingness elasticity parameter, δi, with αi = 4, bi = 8 and ci = 5. As can be observed,
the willingness elasticity parameter, δi, has no affect on the value of the optimal price, piopt .
Without loss of generality and so as to simplify the analysis, we assume δi = 2 for both WSPs.
Fig. 4(c) plots the expected profit per unit time for different assumed values of shape, αi, with
bi = 8, δi = 2 and costi = 5. It can be seen that the value of the optimal price, piopt , is sightly
affected by the value of shape, αi. For instance, when αi = 3 the corresponding piopt is 7.9
while when αi = 13 the corresponding piopt is 6.9. Note that the shape α is supposed to be a
very large number for a normal service. For ease of illustration, we assume αi = 10 and δi = 2.
Then the maximization problem in Equation 16 becomes:
max
i∈{1,2}
Πi(pi) =
{
λN[1− 56 ( pibi )2](pi − ci) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi;
1
6λN(
bi
pi
)10(pi − ci) pi > bi,
subject to U1(p1opt ) = U2(p2opt ) > 0 and E1(p1opt ) + E2(p2opt ) ≤ 1.
(17)
Thus, we obtain the optimal price as
piopt =
{
1
3 (ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi;
10
9 ci pi > bi.
(18)
Clearly, when bi ≥ 109 ci, pi = 13 (ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ) is the maximum of the profit function defined
in Equation 17, while when bi <
10
9 ci, pi =
10
9 ci is the maximum. Since dynamic pricing is our
main concern, in the rest of the chapter we will confine attention to the case of bi ≥ 109 ci and
study the Nash equilibrium prices for this case.
Summarily, under the assumption αi = 10 and δi = 2, a pair of strategic equilibrium prices
(p∗1 , p
∗
2) for the two WSPs has to satisfies the following maximization problem:
max
i∈{1,2}
Πi(pi) = λN[1− 56 (
pi
bi
)2](pi − ci)
subject to U1(p1opt ) = U2(p2opt ) > 0 and E1(p1opt ) + E2(p2opt ) ≤ 1,
(19)
where bi ≥ 109 ci and Ei(pi) = 1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi . Note that the corresponding optimal price piopt =
1
3 [ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ].
In order to investigate the Nash equilibrium in this model, we performed the following
simulations in which two WSPs provide wireless services in a market with N = 30 users.
Each user generates packets according to a Poisson process with rate λ = 10packet/sec, and
the service times of individual packet are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean 300−1sec.
The costs of WSP1 and WSP2 per packet are c1 = 7 and c2 = 5 units respectively. Assume that
both WSPs choose α = 10 and δ = 2. Then WSPi’s optimal price, piopt , is
1
3 [ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ].
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(a) Expected profit per unit time versus quoted
price (varying scale parameter b)
(b) Expected profit per unit time versus quoted
price (varying willingness elasticity parameter δ)
(c) Expected profit per unit time versus quoted
price (varying willingness elasticity parameter α)
Fig. 4. Expected profit per unit time versus quoted price under different parameters
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For the sake of ease of simulation, WSPi’s prices fall into the range of [ci,2ci], which implies
that 109 ci ≤ bi ≤
√
20
3 ci and 0.167≤ Ei(piopt ) ≤ 0.5.
Since a Nash equilibrium would exist when Equation 10 holds, the following expression can
be derived:
p∗1opt − p∗2opt =
5
54
λN[(ξ1 +
√
ξ21 +
18
5
)
2
− (ξ2 +
√
ξ22 +
18
5
)
2
], (20)
where ξ1 =
c1
b1
and ξ2 =
c2
b2
. Combining the constraint condition ∑2i=1 Ei(pi) ≤ 1, Nash
equilibrium prices (p∗1opt , p
∗
2opt
) can be obtained. Evidently, Nash equilibrium prices (p∗1opt , p
∗
2opt
)
are dependent on the ratio of the cost, ci, and the parameter, bi, of the probabilistic model for
user’s willingness-to-pay.
In the simulation, a two-dimensioned numerical search procedure is employed to obtain
the equilibrium prices. The search procedure is described as follows. Firstly, WSPi (i =
1,2) determines bi according to algorithm 1 and calculates corresponding piopt , respectively.
Note that here variable bi is used to represent the users’ different responses to the WSPs’
quoted prices. For convenience, in the rest of section, piopt and pi are interchangeable.
Let {p11, p21, · · · , pn1} and {p12, p22, · · · , pn2} be optimal price strategy forms of WSP1 and WSP2
respectively. We start by finding the expected user’s compensated utilities with WSP1 and
WSP2 respectively, given that WSP0 and WSP1 set their prices according to their optimal
price strategy forms respectively. We first keep WSP1’s price fixed at p
1
1, while WSP2’s price
continuously changes according to its price strategy form {p12, p22, · · · , pn2}. The continuous
price change allows us to identify the equilibrium compensated utilities, namely U0 = U1.
Thus, the equilibrium prices, (p1∗1 , p
1∗
2 ), that correspond to the equilibrium compensated
utilities are identified. We then proceed to the next price in {p11, p21, · · · , pn1}.
Algorithm 1
begin
b11 ← 109 c1
for b1 =
10
9 c1 to
√
20
3 c1 do
bi1 = b
i−1
1 + 0.005
b12 ← 109 c2
for b2 =
10
9 c2 to
√
20
3 c2 do
bi2 = b
i−1
2 + 0.005
end
end
end
Fig. 5 illustrates the value difference between U2(p2) and U1(p1), U2(p2)−U1(p1), under
different pairs of prices (p1, p2). The pairs of prices that make U2(p2) = U1(p1) are Nash
equilibrium prices we are looking for. Note that using the bi obtained according to the above
algorithm one could only find out pairs of prices (p1, p2) which make U2(p2)−U1(p2) ≈ 0.
Here, we actually refer to the pairs of prices (p1, p2) which make U2(p2)−U1(p1)≈ 0 as Nash
equilibrium prices, which is represented as (p∗1 , p
∗
2)
Table 1 lists some pairs Nash equilibrium prices and the corresponding acceptance rates. As
is observed, both WSPs have to set their price within a certain range so that the constraint
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Fig. 5. U2(p2)−U1(p1)
p1 9.8033 10.77 11.71 12.78 13.28 13.688
E1(p1) 0.3638 0.4118 0.4458 0.4749 0.4861 0.4942
p2 7.114 7.8227 8.6116 9.4802 9.9847 10.236
E2 p2) 0.3727 0.4192 0.4562 0.4859 0.4973 0.5057
Table 1. Nash equilibrium price versus Nash equilibrium acceptance rate
E1(p
∗
1) + E2(p
∗
2) ≤ 1 can be satisfied. For instance, as shown in Table 1, when the WSP2 with
lower price increases its price higher than twice its cost, E2(p
∗
2) > 0.5, as a response, WSP1
with higher price also increases its price, which in turn lead to E1(p
∗
1) + E2(p
∗
2)> 1. It implies
that these two WSPs cannot increase their price as high as they want without cooperation.
Table 2 lists the user’s compensated utilities with the two WSPs under different prices. As
can be observed, for example, if WSP1 initially sets its price at 12.906 while WSP2 initially
sets its price as 5.635, U1(p1) < U2(p2) and the users will choose to subscribe or switch to
WSP2. Then WSP1 will have to decrease its price to attract more users, while WSP2 would
increase its price considering its congestion situation or just leave its price unchanged. This
price adjusting process will be repeated until p1 and p2 converge to the point at which the
compensated utility experienced by the users with WSP1, U1, is equal to the compensated
utility experienced by the users with WSP2, U2. For instance, WSP1 decreases its price to
11.084 while WSP2 increases its price to 8.112. At this point, U1(p
∗
1) = U2(p
∗
2), no WSP has
any incentive to deviate from its price without the cooperation of the other, which may not
happen, until existing users voluntarily disconnect or new users join in.
When the number of users in this market N changes, U1(p1) and U2(p2) change accordingly,
which in turn leads to the Nash equilibrium moving. This results in another round of price
adjustment among the two WSPs and the users. As shown in Table 3, if we suppose in the
first round the number of users N = 30 and the two WSPs end up with a Nash equilibrium
with prices p1 = 11.818 and p2 = 8.6976 respectively. When the number of users N increases
or decreases, even if WSP1 keeps its price p1 = 11.818, WSP2 has to change its price such
that both WSPs and the users can reach a new equilibrium. Additionally, when some users
with one WSP disconnect or some new users join in one WSP, the WSP could adjust its price
considering its resource utility or congestion situation. This also could lead to a new round of
adjustment.
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p1 8.246 8.995 9.791 10.237 11.084 11.818 12.478 12.906 13.685
U1 222.13 198.83 181.27 173.54 161.64 153.44 147.26 143.73 138.06
p2 5.635 6.602 7.552 7.774 8.112 8.474 9.187 9.452 10
U2 239.16 195.38 171.46 167.29 161.64 156.37 147.75 145.02 140
Table 2. Users’ compensated utilities
Fig. 6. Equilibrium prices for different number of users N
Fig. 6 plots the equilibrium points (at which U1(p
∗
1)−U2(p∗2)≈ 0) over p1 and p2 for various
N. As can observed, for a given optimal price p1 of WSP1, there is a unique optimal price
p2 of WSP2 so that WSP1 and WSP2 reach Nash equilibrium, and there is a quasi-linear
relationship between p∗1 and p
∗
2 . It is worth noting that this property is useful for a dynamic
pricing competition. Since each optimal price piopt corresponds to a certain value of bi, which
is determined by the traffic load of WSPi, if we simply assume, for WSPi, bi is varied with the
number of users arriving at WSPi, sequentially, the optimal price piopt also varies in response
to the change of the number of the arriving users. Suppose WSP1 and WSP2 set their optimal
prices p1 and p2 based on the numbers of their arriving users respectively, but p1 and p2 are
not in equilibrium. The users who receive a lower compensated utility will switch to another
WSP, which in turn results in an increase of users at one WSP and a decrease of users at the
alternative. Accordingly, p1 and p2 vary gradually until they converge to a Nash equilibrium
point (p∗1 , p
∗
2).
4. An extended pricing model for wireless oligopolies
In this section, we extend the two-stage noncooperative game model described in Section 3 to
a multi-provider setting as shown in Fig. 7.
4.1 Model description
Assume that there is a set I = {0,1,2, . . . , I − 1} of WSPs in a certain area to provide
wireless services to N potential users. Denote pi and ci as WSPi’s price and cost per packet
transmission respectively. Each user generates packets according to a Poisson process with
mean rate λ. Then the potentially total mean arrival rate of packets in the whole network is
given by λN. Note that λN can be seen as an arrival rate when all potential users send out
297Wirel ss Service P icing under Multipl  Competitive Providers and Congestion-sensitive Users
www.intechopen.com
18 Wireless Mesh Networks
p1 8.246 8.9975 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.818 12.112 − −
U1 280.15 275.64 272.05 270.39 267.7 265.73 265 − −
N = 5 Π1 14.46 30.64 50.68 62.71 86.63 108.19 117 − −
p2 6.1613 6.8438 7.6099 8.0513 8.9159 9.6874 10 − −
U2 280.15 275.65 272.05 270.39 267.7 265.72 265 − −
Π2 15.90 32.28 53.09 65.78 91.56 115.26 125 − −
p1 8.246 8.9945 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.818 12.478 12.7 −
U1 268.55 260.28 253.9 251.02 246.49 243.27 240.77 240 −
N = 10 Π1 28.92 61.28 101.36 125.41 173.27 216.37 256.11 269.61 −
p2 6.0265 6.6407 7.3191 7.7071 8.4705 9.1531 9.7964 10 −
U2 268.56 260.29 253.89 251.03 246.49 243.27 240.77 240 −
Π2 26.09 54.26 89.96 111.7 156.3 197.58 236.68 250 −
p1 8.246 8.9945 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.821 12.481 12.906 13.187
U1 245.34 229.56 217.59 212.28 204.06 198.33 194 191.52 189.99
N = 20 Π1 57.83 122.56 202.71 250.82 346.54 433.11 512.59 584.49 599.03
p2 5.9594 6.5336 7.1592 7.5159 8.2071 8.8205 9.3845 9.7544 10
U2 245.33 229.57 217.59 212.28 204.05 198.34 194.01 191.5 190
Π2 47.74 97.99 162.48 201.78 281.39 354.68 423.58 469.5 500
p1 8.246 8.9945 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.818
∗ 12.478 12.906 13.685
U1 222.13 198.83 181.24 173.54 161.64 153.44 147.26 143.73 138.06
N = 30 Π1 86.75 183.84 304.07 376.23 519.8 649.12 768.32 846.73 991.04
p2 5.9361 6.498 7.105 7.4492 8.1124 8.6976
∗ 9.2333 9.5853 10.236
U2 222.13 198.83 181.27 173.54 161.64 153.44 147.26 143.73 138.06
Π2 67.34 141.81 234.96 291.49 405.39 509.75 607.48 672.59 794.28
p1 8.246 8.9975 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.821 12.478 12.906 13.474
U1 210.53 183.38 163.12 154.17 140.42 130.95 123.89 119.84 115
N = 35 Π1 101.21 214.97 354.74 438.94 606.44 757.95 896.38 987.85 1110.5
p2 5.9303 6.4891 7.09 7.431 8.8049 8.6638 9.1901 9.5358 10
U2 210.48 183.41 161.1 154.14 140.43 130.96 123.88 119.83 115
Π2 77.76 163.91 271.3 336.53 467.33 587.59 699.46 773.97 875
p1 8.246 8.9975 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.818
∗ 12.478 12.909 13.53
U1 198.92 168.11 144.96 134.8 119.21 108.53 100.51 95.91 90
N = 40 Π1 115.67 245.12 405.42 501.64 693.07 865.5 1024.4 1129.7 1282.9
p2 5.9245 6.4801 7.0779 7.4159 8.0635 8.6362
∗ 9.1562 9.4988 10
U2 198.93 168.09 144.95 134.78 119.23 108.51 100.51 95.92 90
Π2 87.96 185.66 307.48 381.24 529.1 664.89 791.08 875.37 1000
p1 8.246 8.9945 9.7912 10.237 11.084 11.818
∗ 12.481 12.906 13.614
U1 175.72 137.39 108.65 96.06 76.78 63.62 53.72 48.16 39.99
N = 50 Π1 144.58 306.4 506.78 627.06 806.34 1081.9 1281.5 1411.2 1629.6
p2 5.9187 6.4683 7.0599 7.3947 8.0361 8.5962
∗ 9.1099 9.4432 10
U2 175.64 137.41 108.69 96.06 76.77 63.63 53.73 48.15 40
Π2 209.95 288.67 517.49 629.44 707.32 842.3 935.83 1087.6 1181.6
Table 3. Users’ compensated utilities for different number of users N
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Fig. 7. Pricing model for multiple WSPs
all their requests without considering price or QoS. In addition, we stick to the mathematical
definition of user’s utility and compensated utility in Section 3. Then the user’s compensated
utility Ui with WSPi can be expressed as:
Ui = Ui(EDi)− pi = 1/EDi − pi = µ− λNEi(pi)− pi, (21)
where i = 0,1,2, . . . , I − 1.
Similar to the duopoly case, from a user’s perspective,
– if Ui < 0 for all i ∈ I, the user will opt out of all the WSPs;
– if Ui > 0 and Ui > U−i, where the subscript −i represents all the WSPs belonging to I
except i itself, the user will subscribe to WSPi;
– only if U0 = · · · = Ui = · · · = UI−1 > 0, the user is indifferent among these WSPs.
In the situation in which the indifference relation
U0(ED0)− p∗0 = · · · = U0(ED0)− p∗i = · · · = UI−1(EDI−1)− p∗I−1 > 0 (22)
holds, all the WSPs and users reach a Nash equilibrium and the set of prices
{p∗0 , p∗1 , p∗2 , · · · , p∗I−1} is the Nash equilibrium prices.
Similarly, the profit function for WSPi per unit time, Πi, is given by Πi = λNEi(pi)(pi − ci).
Thus, solving the following maximization problem gives WSPi’s optimal price at which WSPi
maximizes its profit:
maxΠi(pi) =
{
λN[1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi ](pi − ci) ci ≤ pi ≤ bi;
λN δiαi+δi (
bi
pi
)αi (pi − ci) pi > bi,
(23)
where i = 0,1, . . . , I − 1.
According to the previous analysis in Section 3, the maximization problem Equation 23 can be
reduced to the following maximization problem:
max
i∈0,1,...,I−1
Πi(pi) = λN[1− 56 (
pi
bi
)2](pi − ci)ci ≤ pi ≤ bi
subject to U0(p0opt ) = U1(p1opt ) = . . . = UI−1(pI−1opt ) > 0
and
I−1
∑
i=0
Ei(piopt ) ≤ 1,
(24)
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where bi ≥ 109 ci and Ei(pi) = 1− αiαi+δi (
pi
bi
)δi . Note that the corresponding optimal price piopt =
1
3 [ci +
√
c2i +
18
5 b
2
i ].
In the next section, we will show the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in this
oligopoly model.
4.2 Equilibrium: existence and uniqueness
In equilibrium, the distribution of users among the WSPs has to be stable from a macro
perspective, meaning that a new arrival user will randomly subscribe to a particular WSPi
(i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1) and the users who already subscribed to a WSP have no incentive to
switch to a different WSP. This indicates that the compensated utilities Ui (i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1)
should be non-negative and equal to each other for all WSPi (i = 0,1,2, · · · , I− 1). Without loss
of generality, we assume that c0 < c1 < c2 < · · · < cI−1. We then take WSP0’s optimal price
p0opt and cost c0 as references such that the equilibrium price of WSPi (i = 1,2, · · · , I − 1) can
be expressed as a function of p0opt and c0. The condition that all the compensated utilities Ui
(i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1) are equal in equilibrium can be expressed as:
µ− λNE(p0opt )− p0opt = µ− λNE(piopt )− piopt , (25-1)
where Ei(pi) = 1− 56 (
pi
bi
)2; (25-2)
and piopt =
1
3
(ci +
√
c2i +
18
5
b2i ), (25-3)
(25)
for all i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1.
From Equation 25-3, we obtain:
6b2i = 15p
2
iopt
− 10piopt ci. (26)
Substituting bi into Equation 25-2, we get:
Ei(piopt ) = 1−
piopt
3piopt − 2ci
. (27)
Substituting Ei(piopt ) into Equation 25-1 results in:
piopt − p0opt = λN(
piopt
3piopt − 2ci
− p0opt
3p0opt − 2c0
). (28)
Dividing p0opt on both sides of Equation 28 and denoting
piopt
p0opt
by ξi, we have
ξi − 1 = λN( ξi3piopt − 2ci
− 1
3p0opt − 2c0
). (29)
Substituting
6b2i
5piopt
for 3piopt − 2ci, Equation 29 can be rewritten as:
ξi(
5pioptλN
6b2i
− 1) = 5p0optλN
6b20
− 1. (30)
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Dividing p0opt on both sides of Equation 30 again, we can obtian
ξi(
5ξiλN
6b2i
− 1
p0opt
) =
5λN
6b20
− 1
p0opt
. (31)
Here Equation 31 is a quadratic equation in ξi, which can be rewritten as:
a1ξ
2
i + a2ξi + a3 = 0. (32)
where
a1 =
5λN
6b2i
, a2 = − 1p0opt
, a3 =
1
p0opt
− 5λN
6b20
.
The solutions to Equation 32 are
−a2±
√
a22−4a1a3
2a1
, in which
a22 − 4a1a3 =
1
p20opt
+
25λ2N2
9b20b
2
i
− 10λN
3p0opt b
2
i
.
It is straightforward to prove that 25λ
2 N2
9b20b
2
i
>
10λN
3p0opt b
2
i
given that 5p0optλN > 6b
2
0, which can be
rewritten as λN > 3p0opt − 2c0. Later we will show that p0opt ≤ 2c0. Thus λN > 3p0opt − 2c0 ≥
4c0. Note that λN represents the mean rate that all N users generate packets per second
while c0 is WSP0’s per packet transmission. Therefore c0 cannot be directly compared to λN.
However, it is reasonable to assume that the cost per packet can be converted into a small
enough unit such that c0 << λN, which means 5p0optλN >> 6b
2
0 always holds.
Since 25λ
2 N2
9b20b
2
i
>
10λN
3p0opt b
2
i
, it can be proved that a22 − 4a1a3 > 1p20opt > 0 and
√
a22 − 4a1a3 > −a2,
meaning that the solutions to Equation 32 are real numbers and only one of them is positive.
Note that piopt for all i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1 are positive. Therefore Equation 32 has a unique
solution, which is a positive real number (
−a2+
√
a22−4a1a3
2a1
). Now it can be concluded that for
all i = 1,2, · · · , I − 1, piopt is linear with p0opt with a coefficient ξi =
−a2+
√
a22−4a1a3
2a1
. In other
words, under the constraint ∑I−1i=0 Ei(piopt ) ≤ 1, for an arbitrary p0opt , there exists a unique piopt
(i = 1,2, · · · , I − 1) in equilibrium with it.
Furthermore, by investigating the unique solution to Equation 32, we find that ξi ≈
1
p0opt
+
√
25λ2 N2
9b20 b
2
i
5λN
3b2
i
>
bi
b0
. Let bib0 be ki. Thus ξi = γiki, where γi
∼=
1
p0opt
5λN
3b2
i
+ 1. It can be proved that γi
approximates to 1 but is strictly greater than 1. According to Equation 26,
k2i =
b2i
b20
=
3p2iopt − 2piopt ci
3p20opt − 2p0opt ci
=
3γ2i k
2
i p
2
0opt
− 2γiki p0opt ci
3p20opt − 2p0opt ci
. (33)
Solving Equation 33, ki is given by
ki =
2γici
3γ2i p0opt − 3p0opt + 2c0
. (34)
Since γi ∼= 1, ki ∼= γi cic0 .
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In summary,
piopt
p0opt
∼= γi bib0 ∼= γ2i
ci
c0
, where γi ∼= 1, and under the constraint ∑I−1i=0 Ei(piopt )≤ 1, for
an arbitrary p0opt , the higher the cost ci the greater γi, meaning for WSPi the higher the cost ci
the higher the corresponding equilibrium price, piopt .
The constraint ∑I−1i=0 Ei(piopt ) ≤ 1 can be expressed as:
I − 5
6
(
p20opt
b20
+
p21opt
b21
+ · · ·+
p2I−1opt
b2I−1
)
=I − 5
6
p20opt
b20
(1 + γ21 + · · ·+ · · ·+ γ2I−1)
≈I − I 5
6
p20opt
b20
=IE0(p0opt ) ≤ 1.
(35)
Here Equation 35 indicates that the maximum value of E0(p0opt ), which is denoted by E0max ,
approximates to 1I . The corresponding optimal price is denoted as the maximum optimal
price p0max . Then, it is straightforward to prove that the greater the number of providers I the
lower the maximum optimal price p0max that WSP0 could reach. This in turn means that, in
equilibrium, all other WSPs’ maximum optimal prices, pimax for all i = 1,2, · · · , I − 1, are lower
accordingly. Thus, when more WSPs enter into the market, in equilibrium, the maximum
prices they can charge decreases.
4.3 Numerical examples
In order to verify the analytical results obtained in the previous section, we performed the
following simulations where several WSPs provide wireless services in a market with N = 40
users. Each user generates packets according to a Poisson process with rate λ= 10packet/sec,
and the service time of individual packet are i.i.d. exponentially distributed with mean
300−1sec.
To study the impact of an entry of a new WSP on the existing WSPs, we first conducted a
simulation where there are two WSPs: WSP0 and WSP1 competing in the market. The costs
of WSP0 and WSP1 per packet are c0 = 5 and c1 = 7 units respectively. For convenience, in
the rest of section, piopt and pi are interchangeable. Let {p10, p20, · · · , pn0} and {p11, p21, · · · , pn1}
be optimal price strategy forms of WSP0 and WSP1 respectively. Using the same approach
that we used to identify the equilibrium in Section 3, we find the set of the equilibrium prices
{(p1∗0 , p1∗1 ), (p2∗0 , p2∗1 ), . . . , (pn∗0 , pn∗1 )}, which is represented as (p∗0 , p∗1) in the rest of the section.
Fig. 8(a) plots (p∗0 , p∗1). As can be seen, in equilibrium, for an arbitrary p
∗
0 , there is a unique
p∗1 corresponding to it. In particular, p
∗
0 is quasi-linear with p
∗
1 . Under the same assumptions,
p∗0max and p
∗
1max
are 9.997 and 13.526 respectively.
We then simulated another scenario where the third WSP, WSP2, joins WSP0 and WSP1.
WSP2’s cost per packet c2 = 9 units and its optimal price strategy form is {p12, p22, · · · , pn2}.
Using the same approach, we obtained the equilibrium prices (p
′∗
0 , p
′∗
1 , p
′∗
2 ), which are plotted
in Fig. 8(b) to compare with those obtained from the two-WSP scenario. As can be observed, in
equilibrium, for an arbitrary p
′∗
0 , there are unique p
′∗
1 and p
′∗
2 corresponding to it respectively.
Again, p
′∗
0 is linear with p
′∗
1 and p
′∗
2 respectively. In addition, the range of values for the
equilibrium prices (p∗0 , p∗1) in two-WSP case shown in Fig. 8(a) is larger than that in three-WSP
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Fig. 8. Equilibrium prices: two-WSP scenario vs three-WSP scenario
case shown in Fig. 8(b). This is because of the equilibrium condition ∑I−1i=0 Ei(piopt ) ≤ 1∀i = 0,1,2, · · · , I − 1, which restricts the allowed values for p∗i as analyzed in Equation 35.
When the number of WSPs increases to 3 from 2, under the same assumptions, the maximum
equilibrium prices p
′∗
0max
and p
′∗
1max
are 6.623 and 9.186 respectively. Evidently, p
′∗
0max
and p
′∗
1max
are significantly lower than those obtained in two-WSP scenario.
Fig. 9 illustrates the expected profits of all WSPs associated with the equilibrium prices plotted
in Fig. 8. Similarly, the range of the values for the expected profit in two-WSP case is larger
than that of three-WSP case. As we can see, in three-WSP scenario, the expected profits of
WSP0 and WSP1 are lower than those of two-WSP scenario, because WSP2 takes some market
share.
When the number of potential users, N, in this market changes, the expected compensated
utility Ui changes, which in turn changes the current Nash equilibrium. This leads to another
round of price adjustment among the WSPs and the users. Table 3 lists some equilibrium
prices, the corresponding expected compensated utilities and the corresponding expected
acceptance rate with various number of potential users, N. As shown in Table 3, if we suppose
in the first round N = 30 and the three WSPs end up with a Nash equilibrium with p0 = 6.2970,
p1 = 8.7274 and p2 = 11.114. When the number N changes, even if WSP0 keeps its price
p0 = 6.2970 unchanged, WSP1 and WSP2 have to change their price such that the three WSPs
and the users can reach a new equilibrium.
It has been shown that, with the proposed pricing scheme, when a new WSP enters into a
market with two or more WSPs already existing, the maximum equilibrium prices that the
existing WSPs can reach will decrease. For a WSP, besides its traffic load status, cost is another
factor determining its optimal prices, which in turn affects the WSPs’ equilibrium prices.
Thus, a follow-up question would be how the cost of the new WSP affects the equilibrium
prices of the existing WSPs. Then another three-WSP scenario simulation, in which costs
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p0 5.7624 5.7769 5.9918 6.1528 6.2970
∗ 6.3827 6.4864 6.5726 6.9011
U0 273.31 273.03 269.09 266.59 264.53 263.39 262.09 261.06 257.58
E0 0.2092 0.2120 0.2487 0.2726 0.2918 0.3023 0.3143 0.3236 0.3552
p1 7.9153 7.9325 8.2041 8.4020 8.5776
∗ 8.6833 8.807 8.9133 9.3052
N = 10 U1 273.30 273.03 269.10 266.58 266.53 263.38 262.10 261.05 257.56
E1 0.1878 0.1904 0.2262 0.2502 0.2689 0.2794 0.2912 0.3004 0.3313
p2 10.003 10.023 10.336 10.565 10.766
∗ 10.885 11.026 11.146 11.583
U2 273.29 273.03 269.09 266.58 264.54 263.39 262.10 261.06 259.57
E2 0.1670 0.1695 0.2051 0.2285 0.2470 0.2573 0.2690 0.2780 0.3084
p0 5.6587 5.7769 5.9918 6.1528 6.2970
∗ 6.3827 6.4864 6.5726 6.7395
U0 256.57 251.83 244.26 239.33 235.35 233.16 230.66 228.70 225.17
E0 0.1888 0.2120 0.2487 0.2607 0.2918 0.3023 0.3143 0.3240 0.3405
p1 7.8493 8.0045 8.2883 8.4984 8.6862
∗ 8.7982 8.9340 9.0436 9.2575
N = 20 U1 256.57 251.87 244.28 239.36 235.38 233.17 230.64 228.70 225.18
E1 0.1779 0.2010 0.2372 0.2726 0.2797 0.2902 0.3021 0.3113 0.3278
p2 10.003 10.195 10.539 10.792 11.017
∗ 11.152 11.314 11.444 11.699
U2 256.59 251.83 244.26 239.38 235.15 233.15 230.63 228.70 225.16
E2 0.1670 0.1899 0.2260 0.2493 0.2680 0.2785 0.2903 0.2993 0.3157
p0 5.6243 5.7769 5.9918 6.1528 6.2970
∗ 6.3827 6.4864 6.5726 6.6828
U0 239.88 230.64 219.39 212.07 206.17 202.93 199.23 196.33 192.84
E1 0.1817 0.2120 0.2487 0.2726 0.2918 0.3023 0.3143 0.3236 0.3349
p1 7.8264 8.0305 8.3203 8.5365 8.7274
∗ 8.8424 8.9784 9.0940 9.2397
N = 30 U1 239.87 230.70 219.40 212.05 206.19 202.91 199.25 196.31 192.81
E1 0.1744 0.2042 0.2409 0.2647 0.2836 0.2941 0.3059 0.3153 0.3265
p2 10.003 10.258 10.614 10.879 11.114
∗ 11.255 11.420 11.562 11.737
U2 239.89 230.65 219.42 212.09 206.21 202.92 199.27 196.31 192.84
E2 0.1670 0.1970 0.2332 0.2568 0.2756 0.2861 0.2977 0.3071 0.3181
p0 5.6071 5.7769 5.9918 6.1528 6.2970
∗ 6.3827 6.4864 6.5726 6.6559
U0 223.20 209.44 194.52 184.81 177 172.70 167.80 163.97 160.44
E0 0.1780 0.2120 0.2487 0.2726 0.2918 0.3023 0.3143 0.3233 0.3323
p1 7.8149 8.0449 8.3378 8.5541 8.7481
∗ 8.8660 9.0021 9.1208 9.2307
N = 40 U1 223.18 209.48 194.49 184.84 177.04 172.64 167.85 164.01 160.43
E1 0.1726 0.2062 0.2429 0.2665 0.2855 0.2962 0.3079 0.3172 0.3258
p2 10.003 10.29 10.655 10.926 11.167
∗ 11.311 11.479 11.622 11.761
U2 223.19 209.53 194.54 184.81 177 172.65 167.85 164.02 160.44
E2 0.1670 0.2005 0.2370 0.2607 0.2796 0.2901 0.3017 0.3109 0.3195
p0 5.5956 5.7769 5.9918 6.1528 6.2970
∗ 6.3827 6.4864 6.5726 6.6381
U0 206.65 188.25 169.65 157.56 147.82 142.47 136.37 131.60 128.14
E0 0.1775 0.2141 0.2510 0.2750 0.2944 0.3048 0.3166 0.3262 0.3304
p1 7.8064 8.0507 8.3466 8.56 8.7657
∗ 8.8779 9.0199 9.1356 9.2218
N = 50 U1 206.58 188.46 169.68 157.57 147.79 142.48 136.31 131.59 128.19
E1 0.1712 0.2082 0.2453 0.2689 0.2880 0.2986 0.3103 0.3197 0.3252
p2 10 10.31 10.681 10.955 11.199
∗ 11.343 11.518 11.663 11.773
U2 206.67 188.37 169.62 157.51 147.81 142.47 136.38 131.57 128.12
E2 0.1667 0.2026 0.2394 0.2633 0.2820 0.2924 0.3042 0.3135 0.3202
Table 4. Equilibrium prices, expected compensated utilities and expected acceptance rates for
different number of users N
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p
′∗
0max
p
′∗
1max
c2 = 1 6.5428 9.0792
c2 = 3 6.6559 9.2307
c0 = 5 c2 = 9 6.6232 9.1861
c1 = 7 c2 = 13 6.5964 9.1534
c2 = 20 6.5815 9.1297
Table 5. Maximum equilibrium prices of WSP0 and WSP1 (p
′∗
0 , p
′∗
1 ) for three-WSP scenario
with various cost of WSP2.
of WSP0 and WSP1 are kept unchanged while WSP2’s cost varies, was conducted. Fig.
10 presents the equilibrium prices (p
′∗
0 , p
′∗
1 ) with WSP2 taking different costs. For ease of
illustration, the maximum equilibrium prices corresponding to Fig. 10 (a), (b) and (c) are listed
in Table 5. It can be observed that when WSP2’s cost is lower than costs of WSP0 and WSP1,
in equilibrium, the maximum prices that WSP0 and WSP1 could reach are lower compared to
the case where WSP2’cost is higher than the costs of WSP0 and WSP1. For the latter case, the
entry of a new WSP with a higher cost results in slight lower maximum equilibrium prices for
both WSP0 and WSP1.
5. Advanced thoughts
The presented material can be usefully extended in a number of ways. In this section only the
extensions will be identified and potential game theory modeling modes indicated.
Firstly an assumption in the section on the basic wireless duopoly was that all users show the
same basic behavior. Relaxing this, a competition between the WSPs and a set of N types of
users can be described. The N types of users could describe economic, social or regulatory
groupings that have differing QoS and price utility definitions. This would allow for the
development of a scaled preference analysis that could be used to gauge more accurately
Fig. 9. Expected profits associated with equilibrium prices in Fig. 8
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Fig. 10. Equilibrium prices of WSP0 and WSP1 (p
′∗
0 , p
′∗
1 ) for three-WSP scenario with various
cost of WSP2.
the social benefits of regulated access to the wireless bandwidth. Secondly the analysis of
oligopoly based pricing depends on the assumption of a mature market where entrances and
exits by WSPs are not relevant. In actual fact this is quite unrealistic and can profitably be
expanded to take into account changes in the number of WSPs during a period and the impact
on both relative profit and market share. Finally by changing the analysis basis queue to
a more dynamic queue with memory effect models of user churn and brand loyalty can be
developed that could show the benefit of branding compaigns.
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The rapid advancements of low-cost small-size devices for wireless communications with their international
standards and broadband backbone networks using optical fibers accelerate the deployment of wireless
networks around the world.â€¨The wireless mesh network has emerged as the generalization of the
conventional wireless network. However, wireless mesh network has several problems to be solved before
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problems that come from the disadvantages in wireless mesh network and give their solutions with challenges.
The contents of this book consist of two parts: Part I covers the fundamental technical issues in wireless mesh
network, and Part II the administrative technical issues in wireless mesh network,. This book can be useful as
a reference for researchers, engineers, students and educators who have some backgrounds in computer
networks, and who have interest in wireless mesh network. It is a collective work of excellent contributions by
experts in wireless mesh network.
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